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ance by 0.4% and Penn Power's annual allowance by 0.5%. Therefore, the overall impact of
the rate orders was not confiscatory. The Court
reasoned that the reduced rates would not
undermine the financial soundness of either
utility nor would the rates deprive individual
investors of just compensation.
Duquesne and Penn Power asserted that the
Act was inconsistent because the "used and useful" standard normally is associated with the fair
value approach and Pennsylvania used the historical cost method. Duquesne and Penn Power
argued further that the Act undermined the
PUC's duty to balance the interests of the consumer and the investor. The Court rejected both
of these arguments. Because the PUC is an arm
of the state legislature it is competent to set
utility rates. Furthermore, utility rates are not
subject to attack merely because a combination
of rate-setting methods are used.
The Court also rejected the contention that
the historical cost rule should be adopted as the
single constitutional standard. A public utilities
commission need not follow any single standard

WEST VIRGINIA STATUTE
REGULATING FUNERAL
INDUSTRY IS NOT PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL REGULATION AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
In National Funeral Services, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1989), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a West Virginia statute regulating preneed funeral contracts was not preempted by
the Federal Trade Commission's ("the FTC's")
Funeral Rule. 16 C.F.R. 453 (1989). The court also
held that the statute did not violate the right to
free commercial speech guaranteed by the first
amendment of the Constitution.
West Virginia Statute
In 1955, the West Virginia legislature determined that preneed funeral contracts were void
unless all proceeds of the contract were placed
in trust pending the contract beneficiary's time

or combination of standards when setting rates.
Such a rule would limit alternatives that may be
beneficial to both consumers and investors. The
Constitution provides broad guidelines wherein
the state legislatures and utility commissions are
free to decide the rates that best serve the interests of the public and the investors.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices Scalia, White and O'Connor concurred. They noted that although the Constitution does not dictate a rate-setting method, the
historical cost or prudent investment method
should always be considered when assessing the
constitutionality of the impact of a particular
rate order.
Justice Blackman dissented. He believed the
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because there was no final judgment before the
Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
invalidated the rate orders set by the PUC and
remanded the case for further ratemaking. Because no new rates had been set, the judgement
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not final.
Martha D. Owens
of need. Since that time, the state legislature
imposed increasingly strict regulations upon
preneed funeral contracts. The current West
Virginia statute ("the Act"), W. Va. Code §47-141 (1983), encompasses all preneed sales of burial
goods, funeral goods, and funeral services, and
declares any contract void which isnot solicited,
drafted, and executed in accordance with the
Act. The statute also requires that all sellers of
such goods be licensed by the state and that all
employees of a seller be certified by the state.
The Act permits the advertisement of preneed
funeral contracts. However, in an effort to reduce fraud and protect privacy, it prohibits two
types of solicitation: 1) in-person or telephone
solicitation of potential purchasers who are in
nursing homes, hospitals, and private residences, and 2)any solicitation of relatives of persons
near death. The Act regulates the terms of the
sale by mandating that ninety percent of the
contract proceeds be placed in a trust pending
the contract beneficiary's time of need, and that
stated procedures for the disposition of trust
income be observed.

Under the Act, the seller is required to provide the agreed upon services at the contract
price, regardless of whether the price of these
services exceeds the amount in the trust at the
time of need. However, if the actual services cost
less than the proceeds in the trust, the seller
must refund the difference. A purchaser may
revoke the contract at any time, while the seller
may revoke the contract for nonpayment only.
The Act establishes a civil remedy for any breach
of its provisions and criminal penalties for the
mishandling of the proceeds of the contract.
Background
When National Funeral Services ("NFS") entered the preneed funeral services market in
1980, the trust requirements of the West Virginia
statute were not in effect because they had been
ruled unconstitutional by a lower state court. In
1982, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reinstated the trust requirements. In 1983,
the statute regulating preneed funeral contracts
was amended to create the more comprehensive system currently in effect. After the statute
was amended, NFS filed suit in federal court
alleging that the Act was preempted by federal
regulation. NFS also challenged the Act's constitutionality, claimed the West Virginia Funeral
Director's Association and several individual
funeral directors had committed antitrust violations, and sought an injunction to prevent the
Act from being implemented. The antitrust
claims were settled and the case proceeded to
trial. The federal court upheld the statute against
all of NFS's challenges.
NFS appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. NFS contended
that the FTC's Funeral Rule regulates the funeral
industry to such an extent that it preempts West
Virginia's regulation of preneed funeral contracts through the Act. NFS also contended that
the state's prohibition against in-person and telephone solicitation violates NFS's right to free
commercial speech guaranteed by the first
amendment.
Statute Not Preempted by Federal Funeral Rule
The Fourth Circuit unanimously held that the
Act was not preempted by federal regulation.
The FTC's Funeral Rule was enacted in response
to the results of a nationwide FTC investigation
of funeral practices. The investigation disclosed
fraudulent sales practices throughout the indus-

try based on an unwillingness on the part of
funeral directors to reveal prices of funeral
goods and services. The court noted that the
purpose of the Funeral Rule was to lower barriers to price competition in the funeral market
and to reduce consumer fraud. The Funeral Rule
requires that prices be disclosed to consumers
who request price information over the telephone and that they be disclosed prior to a sale.
The court emphasized that the Funeral Rule
focuses on the at-need market, whereas the Act
focuses on the preneed market.
The court made three specific inquiries in
order to resolve the question of preemption.
First, the court asked whether the federal regulation is so comprehensive that one can reasonably assume Congress did not intend concurrent
state regulation. The court concluded that the
Funeral Rule was not comprehensive. Instead,
the Funeral Rule was limited in scope because it
focused on particular fraudulent practices relevant to the disclosure of prices of funeral goods
and services.
Second, the court considered whether the
federal interest in the regulated industry is so
dominant that it creates an assumption that state
regulation is precluded. The court found that no
preclusion of state regulation could be assumed.
The Funeral Rule expressly states that if a state
law applies to a sale also governed by the Funeral Rule, and the state law provides protection
at least equal to that provided by the Funeral
Rule, then the state law will govern in that state.
Lastly, the court inquired whether enforcement of the federal and state regulations would
likely result in a conflict. The court found no
possibility of conflict, emphasizing that the federal and state regulatory schemes have a common purpose: consumer protection. The extent
of the Funeral Rule's regulation of preneed contracts is the prohibition of unfair sales practices
and the requirement of price disclosure. The Act
similarly prohibits fraudulent sales techniques
through its ban on solicitation of persons in
nursing homes, hospitals, and private residences. The federal mandate that price information
be disclosed over the phone applies only to consumers who request such information, and
therefore, does not conflict with the West Virginia prohibition against unrequested telephone
solicitation.
(continued on page 104)
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Statute Held to be an Appropriate Restraint on
Commercial Speech
NFS next contended that the West Virginia
ban on uninvited in-person and telephone solicitation was an unconstitutionally broad, contentbased prohibition, and therefore violative of the
first amendment. A majority of the court upheld
the Act but at the same time rejected the district
court's reasoning that the prohibitions did not
regulate the content of the solicitation. The district court had held that the prohibitions were
permissible time, place, and manner restrictions. Time, place, and manner restrictions generally receive less scrutiny than content-based
restrictions.The majority of the Fourth Circuit
noted that the speech at issue was commercial
speech and thus entitled to less first amendment
protection than noncommercial speech. The
majority determined that the prohibitions were
in fact content-based but that, because the
speech being regulated was commercial speech,
the prohibitions in the Act did not violate the
first amendment.
The court employed a four-part test, established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980), to determine whether the contentbased restriction in the Act was appropriate. The
court first considered whether the speech concerned legal activity and whether it was misleading. The majority concluded that the speech was
legal and not misleading. Second, the court considered whether the government interest in
prohibiting the speech was substantial. Because
funeral arrangements are made under difficult
circumstances, the consumer's ability to make
thoughtful decisions is reduced. The possibility
of fraud is therefore increased. The court also
noted the heightened government interest in
protecting the privacy of the home against such
solicitation due to the particularly sensitive subject of the transaction. Both government interests supported prohibiting the solicitation.
Third, the court considered whether the Act
directly advanced the government interest in
reducing fraud and protecting privacy. Because
in-person solicitation provides great potential

for privacy invasion and fraud, the court con-

cluded that the Act's ban on in-person solicitation directly advanced the government interest.
The court also found that the ban on telephone
solicitation directly advanced the government
interest because the threats posed by telephone
solicitation were similar to those presented by
in-person solicitation. The court found both
methods of solicitation dangerous. Unlike written solicitation, neither in-person nor telephone
solicitation is open to public scrutiny and both
are difficult to regulate.
Finally, the court considered whether the
Act's prohibition was overly broad. The court
stated that because commercial speech is afforded less protection than noncommercial
speech, it is not necessary that the prohibition
be the least restrictive alternative. The prohibition is not overly broad if it represents a reasonable means of regulation which is not excessive
in view of the government interests. The court
concluded that the Act's prohibition is not
excessive. The Act seeks to prohibit only two
limited forms of speech, permits alternative
methods of solicitation, and advances a significant state interest.
Concurring Opinions
The first concurring opinion would have upheld the Act's prohibitions as valid time, place
and manner restrictions rather than as valid
content-based restrictions. The regulation of
preneed funeral solicitation can be analogized
to the regulation of attorney solicitation. The
United States Supreme Court, in upholding bans
on in-person solicitation by attorneys, did not
subject the regulation to the stricter scrutiny
required for content-based restrictions. Therefore, preneed funeral solicitation need not be
subjected to this stricter scrutiny.
The second concurring opinion reasoned that
the Act was not preempted by the Funeral Rule,
but that the first amendment issue need not be
decided. Because the trust provision of the Act
had been upheld by the court, and enforcement
of the trust provision would preclude NFS from
operating in West Virginia, the first amendment
issue was moot.
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